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INTRODUCTION: ALL-PARTISAN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR 
AN INF AGREEMENT 
Public opinion on national security and arms control in the Federal 
Republic of Germany became severely polarized along partisan lines 
in the 1980s, especially so over the deployment of new American 
INF. 1 To a considerable extent this was a consequence of strong 
disagreement among the political parties on these issues.2 Before 
the INF agreement was signed in Washington in December 1987, its 
prospect was widely hailed in West Germany, but many reservations 
about first the zero-option, and later the double-zero-option, were 
also voiced at home and abroad by German politicians and security 
experts, notably by conservative circles of the goveming Christian 
Democrats (CDU-CSU).3 This opposition did not, however, lead to a 
partisan polarization of mass public opinion comparable with that over 
the two tracks of NATO's dual-track decision of 1979 for two reasons. 
First, this opposition reflected a split within the major governing party, 
and not a confrontation of govemment versus opposition parties. 
Second, this scepticism was directed against accomplishments of 
arms control, even disarmament, and the experience of this decade 
has shown that overwhelming majorities of the public at large favour 
arms control measures over considerations of military security when 
confronted with such choices.4 
lt is therefore not at all surprising that the zero-option and the 
double zero-option have enjoyed, and still enjoy, wide and alJ-
partisan support in West German public opinion. On a great variety 
of national security issues popular attitudes continue to be strongly 
polarized along partisan sympathies, CDU-CSU voters differing from 
adherents of the Greens by 50, 60 or more percentage points on 
questions Iike military spending, the presence of US troops, or 
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Table 7.1 Tue zero option 
FGW: lt has been proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union 
jointly abolish their INF (Mittelstreckenraketen). Are you in favour of this 
so-called zero-option, or are you opposed? 
USIA: Do you strongly favour, somewhat favour, somewhat oppose 
or strongly oppose an agreement eliminating all American and Soviet 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe? 
FGW USIA 
May 1987 Total tDU-CSU SPD FDP Green Total Strongly 
In favour 91 87 94 97 99 89 72 
Opposed 8 12 6 1 1 9 2 
DK,NA 1 1 0 2 0 2 26 
FGW: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen Mannheim, Politbarometer-Series; original 
German question wording translated by the author 
USIA: United States Information Agency, Research Memorandum, 20 May 1987 
DK, NA: Don't know, no answer 
German membership in NATo.s Vis-a-vis the INF agreement such 
polarization is virtually non-existent. In May 1987, when the contours 
of the accord bad become visible, about 90 per cent of West Germans 
were in favour of the zero-option, most of these (80 per cent) even 
said they were 'strongly' in favour (table 7.1). Dissent between voters 
of different parties only ranged from 87 per cent for the zero-option 
among CDU-CSU voters to 99 per cent among Green voters. 
At the same time, all-partisan endorsement of the double-zero-
option was almost identical with that of the simple zero-option 
(table 7.2). United States Information Agency (USIA) data from 
the same month might create the impression that the double-zero-
option was significantly less popular than the simple version including 
only INF with ranges over 1000 km, but this conclusion is clearly 
unwarranted. The question asked for USIA is awkward, because by 
talking about Soviet superiority in INF with ranges below 1000 km 
and about 'retaining the right to close the gap' it addressed at least 
two separate issues, and thus might have pushed some respondents 
into rejecting the second zero-option. That this question is confusing 
(especially in a telephone survey) is evident from the percentage 
of refusals. With the straightforward questions of USIA on the 
simple zero-option and of Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (FGW) on 
both versions of the zero-option virtually nobody had such problems 
in responding. 
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Table 7.2 Tue double-zero-option 
FGW: lt has further been proposed that both superpowers also abolish their 
missiles with shorter ranges. Are you in favour of this so-called double-zero 
option, or are you opposed? 
USIA: As you may know, even after the elimination of all American and 
Soviet SS-4, SS-20, Pershing II, and Cruise missiles in Europe, the Soviet 
Union will have hundreds of short-range nuclear missiles, and NATO will 
have none. Would you prefer that the United States and the Soviet Union 
agree to ban all shorter-range nuclear missiles, or that NATO retain the right 
to build some shorter-range nuclear missiles to close the gap with the Soviet 
Union? 
FGW 
May 1987 Total CDU-CSU SPD 
In favour 90 
Opposed 9 
DK,NA 1 
84 
15 
1 
95 
5 
0 
FDP Green 
95 
4 
1 
99 
1 
0 
USIA 
Total 
73 
12 
15 
Because of their strength, partisan discrepancies in German mass 
attitudes on national security have repeatedly been analysed over 
the past decade.6 With respect to the INF agreement this is not 
exactly thrilling. Because very large portions of the population favour 
arms control and disarmament as general concepts this treaty is 
exceedingly popular across party lines. We will therefore now turn 
to some important clusters of public attitudes that surround this 
all-partisan support; that is, to perceptions of the general national 
security environment, to the allocation of praise and credit for the 
agreement, and to judgements about its consequences and about 
possible future courses of action for the West. Here we will quickly 
discover that the effects of earlier partisan disagreements on public 
opinion have not been suddenly and completely wiped out by this 
near-universal consensus about the INF treaty itself. 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT 
In this section we will briefly look at perceptions of the East-West 
military balance, of a Soviet threat, and of the stability of peace in 
Europe. As to the first perception, it has been shown that the major 
change of attitudes in West Germany has occurred between the 1960s 
and the 1970s.7 Whereas up to 1970 more people believed the West, 
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rather than the East, to be superior in military terms, since then this 
has been reversed, reflecting the large-scale build-up of military forces 
by the Soviet Union and its ascent to rough nuclear parity. Up to the 
mid-1980s surveys produced rather stable results, about 40 per cent 
responding that both sides were equally strong, somewhat over 10 per 
cent continuing to believe in Western superiority, and almost one-half 
of samples perceiving Eastern superiority. These judgements appear 
to have changed in more recent years. While the (low) share of those 
who see Western superiority has remained the same, perceptions of 
Eastern superiority have gone down, and those of equal military 
strength have gone up (table 7.3). For about 15 years the most 
frequent view always bad been one of Eastern superiority; now it is 
one of parity. Partisan convictions continue to have a strong impact 
on such judgements: across the political spectrum from CDU-CSU 
to Green voters, the percentage still perceiving Eastern superiority 
drops from 41to13 per cent. 
If one asks only for the conventional balance, one again gets almost 
the 'old' responses prevalent for the overall correlation of forces from 
1970 into the early 1980s; that is, most people perceiving Eastern 
superiority, and about 40 per cent parity (table 7.4). The results 
for May 1987 show that the discrepancies between evaluations of 
the overall and of the conventional balance alone are roughly the 
same across all partisan groups, about 10 per cent less perceiving 
conventional than overall parity, and about 10 per cent more seeing 
Eastern conventional than overall superiority. This implies that at 
least 10 per cent of total samples primarily have nuclear weapons in 
mind when they are asked to evaluate the military balance in general. 
lt should further be noted that the stable minority of about one-tenth, 
which still sees Western military superiority, does so almost regardless 
of whether total or only conventional forces are to be evaluated, and 
Table 7.3 Tue military balance 
FGW: Who do you believe is stronger in military terms: the West, the East, 
or do you think that both sides are equally strong? 
Total May 1987 
May 1983 April 1985 May 1987 CDU-CSU SPD FDP Green 
West 11 14 11 9 12 9 5 
East 47 40 35 41 33 39 13 
Equal 42 45 53 49 54 52 60 
DK,NA 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 
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Table 7.4 The conventional military balance 
FGW: And if you leave out nuclear weapons, that is if you only consider 
conventional armaments, who is stronger: the West, the East, or do you think 
that both sides are equally strong? 
May 1987 
West 
East 
Equal 
DK,NA 
Total 
12 
45 
42 
1 
CDU-CSU 
9 
51 
39 
1 
SPD 
13 
43 
42 
2 
FDP 
6 
51 
41 
2 
Green 
20 
21 
59 
0 
tbat tbis view is especially frequent arnong Green voters (20 to 25 per 
cent). 
Not only bas tbe military balance come to be seen more favourably 
in recent years, but tbe same is true for perceptions of a Soviet tbreat 
in tbe Federal Republic. Historically, tbe major decline !tere bas been 
from tbe 1950s to tbe 1960s, but until 1985 usually sornewbat more 
tban half of the samples have replied that there is such a threat. 8 
According to USIA data this view has become a minority view in 
tbe past 2 years (table 7.5). If undecided respondents are excluded, 
tbe sbare of tbose registering a Soviet tbreat bas fallen to about 
40 per cent. Tbis shift is about tbe same order of rnagnitude as 
the reorientation from perceptions of Eastern military superiority 
towards tbose of parity. In tbe absence of pertinent data one can 
only speculate about tbe causes of tbese cbanges, but tbe bypotbesis 
tbat tbey bave sometbing to do witb tbe image presented by tbe new 
Soviet leadership commands high plausibility.9 We will turn to this 
image later. 
Popular evaluations in West Germany of tbe stability of peace in 
Europe bave exbibited even more pronounced short-term fluctuations 
over the past several years (table 7.6). Comparing 1982 (when 
concerns were highest due to imminent deployment of INF) with 
1987 sbows cbanges tbat can only be described as dramatic. In 1982 
virtually nobody believed tbat peace bad become more secure over tbe 
previous year, 39 per cent said tbere had been no change, but alrnost 60 
per cent said the situation had deteriorated. In 1987 only 16 per cent 
bad tbis gloomy view, wbile over 60 per cent replied tbat tbere bad 
been no cbanges, and almost one-quarter of respondents even saw 
improvements. Tbis evaporation of pessimism in the aggregate was 
strongest from 1982to1984, and then continued at aslowerpace. Itdid 
not occur simultaneously for all partisan groups, however. CDU-CSU 
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Table 7.5 Threat perception 
USIA: Some people say that the Soviet Union is a threat to the long-term 
security of Western Europe. Others say that the Soviet Union is not a threat 
to the long-term security of Western Europe. Which view is closer to your 
own? 
USSR is a threat 
USSR is not a threat 
DK,NA 
October 1986 
39 
53 
8 
May 1987 
32 
50 
18 
voters were the first to reassess the international situation. Apart from 
Green sympathizers, they were the most pessimistic group in 1982. But 
the change in government boosted their confidence instantaneously. 
Within one year, from May 1982 to May 1983, an excess of pessimistic 
judgements of 16 percentage points turned into a surplus of optimistic 
evaluations of 46 percentage points, which thereafter still continued to 
climb steadily. Liberal voters foHowed soon, realizing that the change 
in govemment had not led to major shifts in foreign and security 
policy. Adherents of the opposition Social Democrats Party (SPD) 
took longer to adjust their images of the international climate, the 
major improvement coinciding with the revitalization of arms control 
talks in 1986 and 1987. Green voters most stubbornly held on to 
the doom and gloom views of the early 1980s about the stability of 
peace, but even in this group positive or neutral evaluations began to 
outnumber pessimistic ones in 1986. 
Evaluations of the stability of peace are influenced not only by the 
general climate of international relations and by partisan affiliations, 
but also quite strongly by single spectacular events that receive wide 
media attention. A survey from December 1987 (table 7.6) shows that 
43 per cent of respondents in the Federal Republic believed that the 
INF treaty had made peace in Europe more secure, only 6 per cent 
thought the opposite, and one-half of the sample said the treaty had 
no effect. There was virtuaHy no partisan disagreement on this issue. 
Similar, but less pronounced results have been reported for the first 
Reagan-Gorbachev summit in November 1985. Tue main difference 
in the public opinion response to both events is that positive effects of 
this summit on the stability of peace were seen, not surprisingly, by 
fewer people, and that partisan disagreement over these effects still 
w~s quite ~trong. In fact, voters for the government parties then saw 
th1s summ1t as equally conducive to peace as the later INF accord, 
but SPD adherents were somewhat sceptical, and Green voters much 
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Table 7.6 Perceptions of the stability of peace in Europe 
FGW: Has peace in Europe become more secure over the last year, less 
secure, or has nothing changed? 
FGW December 1985: In November Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva. 
What do you think: has peace in Europe become secure thereby, less secure, 
or has nothing changed? 
FGW December 1987: Has peace in Europe become more secure due to the 
INF agreement, less secure, or has nothing changed? 
Total CDU-CSU SPD FDP Green 
May 1982 more secure 3 3 4 2 3 
no change 39 39 43 44 20 
Iess secure 58 58 53 54 77 
optimism index -16 -16 -6 -8 -54 
May 1983 more secure 6 10 3 2 0 
no change 56 63 52 56 27 
less secure 38 27 45 42 73 
optimism index 24 46 10 16 -46 
March 1984 more secure 9 16 5 9 1 
no change 64 71 60 67 36 
less secure 27 13 35 23 63 
optimism index 46 74 30 54 -26 
December 1985 more secure 31 41 27 43 12 
no change 62 54 64 57 79 
Iess secure 7 5 9 0 8 
optimism index 86 90 82 100 84 
November 1986 more secure 14 17 10 14 5 
no change 66 69 68 76 54 
less secure 20 14 21 10 41 
optimism index 60 72 58 80 18 
May 1987 more secure 23 31 17 19 20 
no change 61 60 64 68 44 
Jess secure 16 9 19 13 36 
optimism index 68 82 62 74 28 
December 1987 more secure 43 44 45 44 43 
no change 51 51 50 56 49 
less secure 6 5 5 0 8 
optimism index 88 90 90 100 84 
Optimism index: defined as 'more secure' plus 'no change' percentages minus 'less 
secure' percentage. 
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more so. In summary then, public opinion in the Federal Republic 
on its post-INF national security environment is characterized by a 
significantly lower recognition of Eastern military superiority and 
of a Soviet threat, and by increased optimism about the chances to 
preserve peace in Europe. 
CREDIT FOR TUE INF AGREEMENT AND IMAGES OF TUE 
SUPERPOWERS 
Logically, the two questions of which side has made bigger concessions 
in the INF treaty, and which side has done more to achieve it and 
deserves more credit, appear tobe very similar. But public opinion 
(not only in the Federal Republic) has a certain tendency not to 
abide by logical rules. In December 1987 more than 60 per cent of 
West Germans said that they saw no difference in the concessions 
both superpowers bad made in the treaty, the rest were almost 
equally divided: 19 per cent saw bigger Soviet, and 17 per cent 
bigger American, concessions (table 7 .. 7). Whereas the share of 
those who saw equal concessions was almost the same across all 
partisan groups, those who recognized unequal concessions from 
Table 7. 7 Who made more concessions in INF agreement? 
FGW: The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate 
all INF (Mittelstreckenwaffen). Who has made more concessions in military 
terms: the United States, the Soviet Union, or do you see no difference? 
December 1987 Total CDU-CSU SPD FDP Green 
United States 17 22 13 19 7 
Soviet Union 19 15 22 23 34 
No difference 63 62 64 58 59 
DK,NA 1 1 1 0 0 
both superpowers were distributed in a characteristic fashion. As one 
travels across the political spectrum from 'right' to 'left', the Soviet 
Union was increasingly regarded as having made more concessions. 
Only among CDU-CSU voters did more people believe that the 
United States, rather than the Soviet Union, bad made the more 
significant concessions. At the other end, almost five times as many 
Green voters saw greater Soviet concessions as saw bigger American 
concessions. This is not the place to argue who is correct. In view 
of the fact that the Soviet Union has agreed to reduce a far higher 
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Table 7.8 Credit for INF agreement 
FGW: Who has worked more for the disarmament agreement: Reagan, 
Gorbachev, or both equally? 
USIA: Who would you say deserves more credit for the recent progress in the 
arms control negotiations: President Reagan or Soviet leader Gorbachev? 
FGW December 1987 USIA May 1987 
Total CDU-CSU SPD FDP Green Total 
Reagan 14 19 10 11 12 9 
Gorbachev 28 17 38 29 43 72 
Equally 58 64 52 60 45 NO 
DK,NA 0 0 0 0 0 19 
NO: not offered. 
number of INF systems and warheads, whereas the United States 
has consented to give up completely the option of being able to hit 
the Soviet Union with land-based missiles from Europe, both views 
can be argued. What matters here, however, is that the judgement 
on 'concessions' in West German public opinion is quite 'fair', with 
almost two-thirds perceiving an equal contribution, and the rest about 
evenly split in the aggregate. 
As soon as one asks not about 'concessions' but about the contribu-
tion of key actors to the outcome, this 'balanced' judgement of public 
opinion does not survive (even in the same survey, see table 7.8). 
Almost 60 per cent said that Reagan and Gorbachev bad contributed 
equally to the agreement, but of those who picked one of these two 
to deserve more credit, twice as many chose Gorbachev than chose 
Reagan. Partisan disagreements on this issue were considerable. 
From CDU-CSU voters to Green voters the view that both deserved 
equal credit declined from 64 to 45 per cent, Reagan was said to 
deserve more credit by 19 per cent of CDU-CSU voters, but only 
by about 10 per cent of all others, and nominations of Gorbachev 
dropped from 43 per cent among Green sympathizers to 17 per cent 
among followers ofthe CDU-CSU. 
That comparable USIA data from May 1987 appears to convey a 
dramatically different message of an overwhelming lead by Gorbachev 
in the popular allocation of credit for progress on arms control can 
be explained fairly easily. First, the USIA question did not offer the 
response that both Reagan and Gorbachev deserved equal credit, 
which produced a high share of undecided responses, and, second, 
at that time the success of arms control negotiations was not yet 
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assured, so the previous tendency to blame Reagan's uncompromising 
policies for the lack of progress in arms control still prevailed. lt is 
more important to recognize fully the incompatibility between tables 
7.7 and 7.8. Since the question in table 7.8 was asked immediately 
preceding the one in table 7. 7, one should expect some kind of transfer 
effect. The later question yielded results that were more 'balanced' 
between the superpowers and less polarized along partisan lines. This 
suggests that the question about which superpower leader deserves 
more credit for the INF agreement has evoked to a considerable 
extent a personal 'beauty coatest', rather than judgements about 
the issue itself, where both criticism of Reagan and 'Gorbimania' 
vary quite strongly across the political spectrum. We will return to 
this 'beauty coatest' shortly. 
The conclusion of the INF treaty has significantly changed popular 
perceptions in West Germany of the superpowers' seriousness about 
arms control. In 1985 still more people believed in American claims 
that the United States was striving for arms control than accepted 
similar Soviet claims (table 7.9). But since 1986 this has been reversed. 
Green voters and sympathizers of the SPD tended to attribute a high 
willingness to engage in arrns control to the Soviet Union, but were 
more or less sceptical about American intentions. Even among voters 
of the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP, the smaller partner in the 
coalition that has been in power since 1982) this pattern started to 
prevail, while only adherents of the CDU-CSU continued to trust the 
United States more than the Soviet Union in this respect. And even in 
this group the credibility of the Soviet Union increased sharply, from 
27 per cent trusting the Soviet commitment to arms control in April 
1985 to 53 per cent in March 1987. 
The events from the summit in Reykjavik to the signing of the INF 
agreement have affected public OJ)inion in the Federal Republic on 
the superpowers' position vis-a-vis arms control in two important 
respects. First, overall trust in their seriousness has gone up by 
almost 20 percentage points from November 1986 to December 
1987. Second, partisan polarization on this issue has been reduced. 
Over this year, the percentage of CDU-CSU voters trusting Soviet 
arms control efforts has grown by 27 points, that of SPD-voters 
believing in American seriousness has gone up by 23 points, and 
even among Green sympathizers this latter proportion has risen by 31 
percentage points. When the INF treaty was finally signed, majorities 
of almost all partisan groups believed in the seriousness of both 
superpowers about further arms control. The shares of those believing 
in the American commitment among Green (45 per cent) and SPD 
voters (49 per cent) no longer feil far short of the 50 per cent 
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Table 7.9 Seriousness of United States and Soviet Union about disarmament 
FGW April 1985 and October 1985: In Geneva the United States and the 
Soviet Union are negotiating about disarmament. Both superpowers stress 
again and again that they want to disarm. Do you believe that the United 
States wants to disarm, or don't you believe that? Do you believe that the 
Soviet Union wants to disarm, or don't you believe that? 
FGW November 1986: Tue United States and the Soviet Union have been 
negotiating about disarmament for some time now. Both superpowers stress 
again and again that they want to disarm ... 
FGW March 1987: Tue United States and the Soviet Union have recently 
made new disarmament proposals. Both superpowers stress again and again 
that they want to disarm . . . 
FGW December 1987: Meanwhile there is talk about further disarmament 
proposals. Do you believe that the United States wants to continue to disarm, 
or don't you believe that? Do you believe that the Soviet Union wants to 
continue to disann, or don't you believe that? 
Total CDU-CSU SPD FDP Green 
April 1985 
USA wants disarmament 35 49 26 47 19 
USSR wants disarmament 26 27 27 40 23 
USA-USSR 9 22 -1 7 -4 
October 1985 
USA wants disarmament 31 40 22 51 29 
USSR wants disarmament 25 23 23 26 40 
USA-USSR 6 17 -1 25 -11 
November 1986 
USA wants disarmament 35 47 26 32 14 
USSR wants disarmament 40 36 58 57 43 
USA-USSR -5 11 -32 -25 -29 
March 1987 
USA wants disarmament 45 60 37 58 15 
USSR wants disarmament 52 53 53 69 60 
USA-USSR -7 7 -16 -11 -45 
December 1987 
USA wants disarmament 53 63 49 57 45 
USSR wants disarmament 59 63 61 53 72 
USA-USSR -6 0 -12 4 -27 
April 1985 
19 32 17 Both want disarmament 21 25 
USA alone wants it 13 24 8 15 3 
USSR alone wants it 5 2 9 8 6 
Both don't want it 59 49 64 45 73 
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October 1985 
Both want disarmament 19 22 16 26 23 
USA alone wants it 11 18 6 24 6 
USSR alone wants it 5 2 7 0 17 
Both don't want it 64 58 71 49 54 
November 1986 
Both want disarmament 24 30 21 20 14 
USA alone wants it 10 17 5 12 0 
USSR alone wants it 16 6 21 23 43 
Both don't want it 49 46 52 45 43 
March 1987 
Both want disarmament 37 46 33 51 15 
USA alone wants it 8 14 4 7 0 
USSR alone wants it 15 6 20 17 45 
Both don't want it 39 33 43 24 40 
December 1987 
Both want disarmament 46 53 45 46 39 
USA alone wants it 7 10 4 11 5 
USSR alone wants it 13 10 16 7 33 
Both don't want it 34 27 35 36 23 
mark. In contrast, in 1985 no majority of any partisan constituency 
bad trusted the earnestness of either superpower. Then the majority 
view, held by about 60 per cent of samples, still was that both did not 
seriously desire arms control. Even about one-half of the voters of the 
government parties shared this opinion. 
Now the opinion that both superpowers are serious has become the 
most frequent one in all partisan groups. Partisan polarization still 
lingers on, however, in the extent to which this view is dominant 
(only 39 per cent among Green, but 53 per cent among CDU-CSU 
voters), andin the direction of trust if only one superpower is accepted 
as being serious. Even though the image of the United States among 
Green voters has improved dramatically, one-third of them still think 
that the Soviet Union alone can be trusted in its pledges for future 
arms control. That scepticism about the arms control policies of the 
United States has not completely been wiped out by the INF accord 
is also evident when one considers how widespread the notion was 
that in the INF negotiations the United States did not take European 
interests into account, a view that was held by over 70 per cent in late 
1986, and still by about 50 per cent in May 1987 (see table 7 .10). 
Returning now to the 'beauty contest' referred to earlier, we 
see that not only was the praise given to the superpowers for the 
accomplishment of the INF treaty influenced by evaluations of their 
respective leaders, but the popular images of these leaders have 
themselvcs been affected by this agreement. President Reagan has 
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Table 7.10 West European interests in INF negotiations 
VSIA: How much do you think the United States is protecting European 
interests during its current negotiations with the Soviet Union on eliminating 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe: a great deal, a fair amount, 
not very much, or none at all? 
Great Fair Not very None at DK, NA 
November 1986 
May 1987 
deal amount much all 
3 
9 
13 
25 
44 
40 
32 
9 
8 
18 
clearly benefited most (table 7.11). Gorbachev's image as 'a man one 
can trust' improved, too, due to the INF treaty (especially so among 
CDU-CSU voters), so that in December 1987 he was evaluated much 
the same by adherents of all parties. But Reagan, who in spring 1987 
still clearly bad trailed behind Gorbachev in being regarded as a 
trustworthy person, almost closed this gap by the end of that year. 
He rose in esteem across the board, among voters of govemment and 
opposition parties alike. Even almost one-third of Green voters now 
thought that he could be trusted, compared with less than 10 per cent 
just a few months before. 
Nevertheless attitudes towards Reagan continued to be more 
polarized along partisan lines than those towards Gorbachev. Whereas 
evaluations of the latter as trustworthy just ranged from 60 to 68 per 
cent (FDP voters vs Green voters), Reagan received this labet from 
about three-quarters of government voters, somewhat less than half 
of SPD voters, and 31 per cent of Green voters. One has to recall, 
however, that this range of judgements on Reagan used to be even 
Table 7.11 Trustworthiness of Reagan and Gorbachev 
FGW: What do you think: Is Ronald Reagan a man one can trust? Is Mikhail 
Gorbachev a man one can trust? 
Total CDU-CSU SPD FDP Green 
March 1987 Reagan 45 61 35 52 9 
Gorbachev 60 58 67 67 60 
May 1987 Reagan 44 63 35 50 6 
Gorbachev 52 50 58 46 60 
Dccember 1987 Reagan 60 78 48 70 31 
Gorbachev 63 65 67 60 68 
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much wider some years, or in fact only some months, earlier. Even 
though this hardly can have been a motivating factor, President 
Reagan's quest to make in into the history books as the 'President 
of peace' has paid off in terms of the 'beauty contest' against 
Gorbachev in West German public opinion. There can be little 
doubt that President Reagan entered this contest as a 'lame duck', 
and that Gorbachev enjoyed a clear head start. This is not only evident 
from the data in tables 7 .8 and 7 .11, but also if one considers the rather 
optimistic expectations in West Germany about the future course of 
Soviet-German relations associated with Gorbachev's ascent to office 
(see table 7.12). Considering bis initial disadvantage, the extent to 
which Reagan caught up is quite remarkable. 
ATTITUDES ON CONSEQUENCES OF TUE INF TREATY 
We already have described several consequences of the INF treaty for 
West German public opinion. Peace in Europe has come tobe seen as 
more secure, trust in the superpowers' seriousness about arms control 
has increased, President Reagan's image has improved, and partisan 
polarization of these attitudes has gone down. We will now turn to 
analysing some attitudes on the immediate impact of this agreement 
on the security of the West and of the Federal Republic. 
First we have to recognize, however, that the level of pertinent 
information and knowledge that respondents command is a crucial 
issue in assessing public opinion on national security and arms control 
matters. Unfortunately there are not many results available on what 
and how much the mass public in the Federal Republic knows about 
the various versions of the zero-option and their military implications. 
Tue one question that has been asked does demonstrate, however, 
that there are indeed good reasons why, for questions about the 
Table 7.12 Relations with the Soviet Union under Gorbachev 
FGW: What do you believe: will relations between the Federal Republic and 
the Soviet Union improve under Gorbachev, will they deteriorate, or will 
there be no change? 
May 1986 Total CDU-CSU SPD FDP Green 
lmprove 36 34 39 35 51 
No change 56 60 54 50 39 
Deteriorate 7 6 7 15 8 
DK,NA 1 0 0 0 2 
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consequences of the zero-option many respondents will wind up 
saying that nothing would change, and why answers about what it 
will do to the military balance, to the stability of peace in Europe, 
to Western security, or to American commitments, etc., are not 
always congruent, but will appear to be affected by the 'flavour' 
of the questions. In May 1987, USIA asked whether, after the 
elimination of all American INF, the United States would still have 
other nuclear weapons left in Europe (table 7.13). To this question 
exactly one-half of respondents replied that they did not know, 13 per 
cent said that after the double-zero-option there would be no such 
weapons left. Only 37 per cent gave the correct answer; that is, almost 
two-thirds revealed their judgements about the implications of the 
INF agreement on the military balance, on Western security and the 
NATO alliance without being aware of American nuclear artillery, 
nuclear gravity bombs, and missiles with ranges below 500 km still 
deployed in Europe, an arsenal well in excess of 4,000 warheads. 
lt is evident that against this background of information the military 
consequences of the zero-option are really very hard to assess, so that 
many people simply have to avoid committing themselves (i.e. have 
to give in-between answers), or can be easily influenced by question 
wording and the information supplied to them during the interview. 
Two more points deserve to be mentioned in this context. First, if 
one should be tempted to regard 37 per cent awareness of residual 
American nuclear weapons in Europe as quite remarkably high ( as 
one could in light of available evidence about even lower levels of 
knowledge10), one should realize that random guessing among those 
who do not simply say that they don 't know would already be expected 
to produce a result of 25 per cent 'awareness'. The actual finding is 
only 12 percentage points higher. Second, the 90 per cent support for 
the double-zero-option can by no means be interpreted as a sweeping 
endorsement of the 'denuclearization' of Europe, because only 13 per 
cent believe that this would be the consequence. The overwhelming 
majority either cannot describe its impact on the nuclear balance in 
Table 7.13 Remaining American nuclear weapons in Europe 
USIA: So far as you know, if all American intermediate-range missiles in 
Europe are eliminated, will the United States have any other nuclear weapons 
stationed in Western Europe with which to defend its allies? 
Yes No DK,NA 
May 1987 37 13 50 
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Europe or claims to be aware of the residual Western nuclear systems 
on the continent. 
Hearing these reservations in mind, comparing table 7.14 with 
table 7 .3 reveals a somewhat surprising pattern of beliefs about the 
effects of the double-zero-option. Since under the terms of the treaty 
the Soviet Union will dismantle about four times as many nuclear 
warheads in Europe as will the United States, one could expect 
perceptions of Eastern military superiority to decline and those of 
Western superiority to increase, but this is not the case. In the 
aggregate, about as many people said that the East would be superior 
after the double-zero-option as had said it before, somewhat fewer 
respondents than before felt that the West would be superior, and the 
proportion of those believing that both sides would be equally strong 
was somewhat higher. Hence, the overall expectation was that as a 
consequence of the double-zero-option the military balance would 
shift somewhat in favour of the East. Whereas these changes were 
only marginal for adherents of all the 'established' parties, the most 
significant shifts in opinion occurred among Green voters. In May 
1987, 25 per cent of them thought the West to be superior, and 
in December 1987 only 10 per cent said that it would be stronger 
after the double-zero-option; over the same time those perceiving 
Eastern superiority increased from 13 to 23 per cent, and those 
perceiving equal military strength from 60 to 67 per cent. Perceptions 
of implications of the INF agreement for the military balance thus 
were strongest among Green voters, among whom it has served to 
dispel illusions about alleged Western superiority. As a consequence, 
Green voters have become more similar to the rest of samples than 
they were before. They still are more prone to detect parity than 
others, and less likely to regard the East as stronger, but previous 
notions about Western superiority have dissolved to a significant 
degree. 
Green voters also clearly set themselves apart from the rest of the 
electorate in terms of whether or not they regard the military balance 
resulting from the double-zero-option as threatening. There was a 
strong all-partisan consensus among those who thought that parity 
would prevail after the double-zero-option and that this would not 
be threatening; about 80 per cent of those predicting parity believed 
this. Green voters were characteristically different from others if 
they expected either Western or Eastern superiority to result from 
the INF treaty. Among adherents of the 'established' parties, most 
of those who predicted Western superiority did not think that this 
would constitute a threat: 90 per cent of FDP voters and over 80 
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Table 7.14 The military balance after elimination of INF 
FGW: After the INF have been eliminated, who is stronger then in military 
terms: the West, the East, or do you think that both sides are equally strong 
then? And do you feel threatened by this? 
December 1987 Total CDU-CSU SPD FDP Green 
West 6 6 8 1 10 
East 37 41 33 39 23 
Equal 57 53 59 60 67 
Threatened 28 23 28 19 32 
Not threatened 72 77 72 81 68 
West, threatened 1(22) 1(17) 2(18) 0(10) 7(66) 
West, not threatened 5(78) 5(83) 7(82) 1(90) 3(34) 
East, threatened 14(39) 15(37) 13(39) 7(19) 15(67) 
East, not threatened 22(61) 26(63) 20(61) 32(81) 7(33) 
Equal, threatened 12(21) 7(13) 14(23) 12(20) 10(15) 
Equal, not threatened 45(79) 46(87) 45(77) 47(80) 57(85) 
Figures in parentheses in the Iower part of this table are percentages of those who feel 
threatened or not, given their evaluation of the military balance. For example, 6 per 
cent of all respondents believed the West tobe superior after elimination of INF, and 
22 per cent of these said this would be threatening (i.e. 1 per cent of the total sample), 
whlle 78 per cent of these (i.e. 5 per cent of the total sample) said this would not be 
threatening. 
per cent of voters for the major two parties shared this view. Out 
of the Green voters who expected Western superiority, two-thirds 
said this would constitute a threat. Adherents of the 'established' 
parties again were quite optimistic, even if they expected Eastern 
superiority: 81 per cent of FDP voters and almost two-thirds of voters 
for the CDU-CSU and SPD believed that this would not constitute 
a threat. However, two-thirds of the Green voters who saw the INF 
treaty leading to Eastern superiority called this threatening, the same 
share as did so for Western superiority. This is probably due to the 
fact that Green sympathizers generally have the lowest confidence in 
the effectiveness of deterrence, and are most strongly opposed to any 
side acquiring military superiority. In summary, data collected with 
the prospect of the double-zero-option in people's minds shows that 
Green voters have become much more ready to perceive considering 
any remaining imbalances as threatening, regardless of whose favour 
they are in. In view of the sometimes low numbers of cases these 
results should be interpreted with some caution, however. 
The data in table 7.14 seems to indicate a certain insecurity on the 
part of the mass public about how to evaluate the military and strategic 
consequences of the INF agreement. Such insecurity is even more 
evident when one examines opinions on which side would benefit 
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Table 7.15 Who benefits from elimination of INF? 
USIA: Who do you think benefits the most in a military sense from the 
elimination of American and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in 
Europe? Would you say the Western alliance gets the most military benefit, 
or the Soviet Union and its allies benefit the most? 
Western alliance Soviet Union and allies Both DK, NA 
May 1987 16 29 40 15 
'Both' not offered, but volunteered by respondents. 
more in military terms from the elimination of INF on both sides, 
a question which is similar to the one about the resulting military 
balance, but not quite identical (table 7.15). People might see very 
unequal benefits, but still retain their judgement about the military 
balance, even if this judgement might be that the side which benefits 
more continues to be inferior. Fifteen per cent of respondents in May 
1987 could not say which side would have greater advantages from 
the elimination of INF, and fully 40 per cent volunteered the option 
that the military benefits to both sides were equal, a most unusual 
indication of insecurity. Only 45 per cent recorded an opinion, 
of which somewhat over one-third said the West would benefit 
more. There are at least two explanations why in spite of the highly 
publicized unequal numbers of INF tobe eliminated almost two-thirds 
believed the Soviet Union would benefit more. First, this could reflect 
exposure to the arguments of the opponents of the zero-option 
about the loss of an important military option for the West, about 
decoupling and singularization of the threat to the Federal Republic. 
Second, it could have something to do with a lack of pertinent 
infonnation required to make this judgement. We have already seen 
that the second explanation has to be taken very seriously. 
Table 7.16 Effect of the elimination of INF on Western security 
USIA: lf the United States and the Soviet Union eventually agree to eliminate 
all of ~heir intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe so that Western 
count.nes rely more on non-nuclear conventional forces, do you think the 
secunty ofWestem Europe will be enhanced remain about the same or will 
it be diminished? ' ' 
Enhance security Remain same Diminish security DK, NA 
May 1987 25 43 22 10 
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Table 7.17 Effect of the elimination of INF on the American commitment 
FGW: Assuming the double-zero-option will go into effect, will this reduce 
or increase the willingness of the United States to defend Europein case of 
emergency (im Ernstfall), or will their be no change? 
USIA: Some people say that the elimination of US intermediate-range 
missiles now in Western Europe will mean that the United States is less 
committed to the defence of Western Europe. Others say that the United 
States will be just as committed to the defence of Western Europe. Which 
view is closer to your own, or haven't you heard enough to say? 
FGW USIA 
May 1985 Total CDU-CSU SPD FDP Green Total 
Reduce 26 27 26 22 20 10 
Increase 9 11 8 10 9 NO 
No change 64 61 65 67 70 65 
DK,NA 1 1 1 1 1 25 
NO: not offered. 
Similar insecurity about the military implications of the INF treaty 
can be observed regarding its effects on Western security. In table 7.6 
a sizeable all-partisan consensus observed that it would make peace in 
Europe more stable. But if people are explicitly reminded that it could 
imply increased Western reliance on conventional armaments, these 
judgements become less optimistic (table 7.16). The percentages of 
those who were undecided or thought that nothing would change are 
roughly the same in both tables (about 50 per cent). But whereas 43 
per cent thought that the agreement would increase the stability of 
peace, and only 6 per cent believed it would be diminished, only 25 
Tab/e 7.18 Necessity of nuclear weapons 
USIA: Would you say that nuclear weapons are necessary in order to defend 
the Federal Republic adequately or should we rely on conventional - that is 
non-nuclear - forces for the defence of our country (Germany)? 
Nuc/ear weapons Rely on DK,NA 
necessary conventional 
June 1986 30 51 19 
January 1987 28 58 14 
May 1987 24 55 22 
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per cent said that Western security would be enhanced, and 22 per 
cent claimed the opposite, if they were reminded of the growing need 
to rely on conventional forces. Both a high popularity of in-between 
responses and greater scepticism about the military consequences 
of the double-zero-option also were discernible when people were 
asked to evaluate the future American commitment to the defence 
of Western Europe ( table 7 .17). Such questions yielded virtually no 
partisan disagreements at all. About two-thirds of respondents said 
the American commitment would remain unchanged, 10 per cent 
believed it would be enhanced, but one out of four respondents 
claimed that it would be reduced due to the double-zero-option. 
Two major items put on the NATO agenda by the double-zero-
option are improvements of its conventional posture and moderniza-
tion and/or numerical increase of the residual INF, that is, with 
ranges below 500 km. A vailable public opinion data shows that 
there is very little enthusiasm in the Federal Republic about any 
attempts to redress the effects of the INF treaty by military means, 
conventional or nuclear. In a very superficial view one could be 
tempted to conclude that the rejection of nuclear weapons should 
have led to growing acceptance of a conventional-emphasis defence 
for NATO. lt is true that the share of those who believe that nuclear 
weapons are necessary for the defence of the Federal Republic had 
declined somewhat, and that the percentage of those who think one 
should rely on conventional forces alone has grown. In the spring of 
1987, 24 per cent held the first view, 55 per cent the second, with 22 
per cent undecided (table 7.18). 
However, this question is about defence and not about deterrence. 
This distribution of opinions, therefore, does not reflect a widespread 
unwillingness to accept nuclear weapons as a keystone of deterrence, 
but it reiterates the well-known fact that support for having nuclear 
weapons in a deterrent role goes down substantially if their usability 
for Western defence is stressed. The more than 50 per cent who said 
that one should rely on conventional forces for the defence of the 
Federal Republic therefore should not be confused with adherents 
of 'conventional deterrence'; they just do not want to see nuclear 
weapons used in the defence of West Germany, one of the major 
reasons being that some of these weapons ( or those of the other 
side) would be used 'at home'. Moreover, only one out of four of 
those who would want to rely on conventional weapons for defence 
would be willing to accept significant increases of the defence budget 
of the Federal Republic in order to make this reliance feasible (table 
7 .19). A conventional-emphasis defence with all its implications thus 
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received very little support, only 14 per cent being willing to rely on 
conventional forces for the defence of the Federal Republic and to 
spend more for that goal. Trying to justify increased defence spending 
and/or upgrading of conventional forces by the need to remedy some 
aspects of the double-zero-option will not meet with majority popular 
approval in West Germany. 
Table 7.19 Attitudes towards spending on conventional weapons 
USIA: Some people say that it would cost a great deal more to deter an attack 
by conventional weapons than by relying on nuclear weapons. Would you 
support or oppose a significant increase in the defence budget of the Federal 
Republic if that would allow us to do without nuclear weapons? 
Support Oppose DK,NA 
May 1987 26(14) 57(31) 17(10) 
Only asked of those who in table 7.18 opted for reliance on conventional weapons. 
Numbers in parentheses are percentages of the total sample. 
Tue public opinion response to the proposed expansion and 
modemization of SRINF is equally predictable. Still in the context of 
the simple zero-option, in May 1987 USIA asked whether respondents 
would, after the ban on LRINF, oppose or support deployment of 
new Western INF below the 1000 km range threshold to offset the 
Soviet superiority existing there (table 7.20). Seventeen per cent 
were undecided, 60 per cent opposed, and only 23 per cent were 
ready to accept such a new round of Nachruestung, even though 
they bad explicitly been reminded of Western inferiority in these 
weapon systems. Even without recent pertinent data it is safe to say 
that now, after the ratification of the INF treaty containing the double-
zero-option, popular opposition to installing new SRINF with ranges 
below 500 km is even significantly stronger. The attempts by the West 
German government to avoid any binding commitment of NATO to 
SRINF modemization before the 1990 federal elections indicate that 
it is weil aware of this public mood and takes it very seriously. 
Two final results on the aftermath of the INF agreement relate to 
compliance and verification. Even though this accord has brought 
sizeable numbers of West Germans to accept the sincerity of the 
superpowers' commitment to arms control, doubts about their willing-
ness to abide by its provisions still are widespread. In May 1987, about 
40 per cent said about either superpower that they believed it would 
observe such an agreement, while about half of those interviewed 
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Table 7.20 Attitudes on new SRINF 
USIA: If NATO retains the right to match the number of Soviet shorter-range 
nuclear missiles, would you support or oppose the deployment by NATO of 
some shorter-range nuclear missiles? 
Support Oppose DK,NA 
May 1987 23 60 17 
expressed scepticism over both sides' compliance, and 10 per cent 
did not have an opinion (table 7.21). At the same time, readiness 
to accept on-site inspection of US bases in the Federal Republic as 
part of an INF verification regime was very high, three out of four 
respondents supporting such measures, and 13 per cent each opposed 
or undecided (table 7 .22). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The INF treaty has been quite an experience for allied national 
security decision makers and experts, but also for Western publics. 
Five major conclusions can be drawn from the reflections of this 
agreement in West German public opinion. First, and most trivially, 
this recent accomplishment of arms control not surprisingly has 
modified many people's perceptions of the country's national security 
environment towards more confident and optimistic evaluations of the 
military balance, the menace from the East, and the solidity of peace 
in Europe. 
Second, very broad segments of the public, even after the events 
from December 1979 to December 1987 and all the media attention 
and reporting they received, still feel uncomfortable and ill at ease 
Table 7.21 Beliefs about compliance with INF agreement 
USIA: How much confidence do you have that the Soviet Union (United 
States) would observe an agreement eliminating all of its intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles in Europe: a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or 
none at all? 
May 1987 
Soviet Union 
United States 
Great 
dea/ 
13 
7 
Fair Not 
amount very much 
28 27 
32 45 
None 
at all 
12 
8 
DK,NA 
10 
8 
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Table 7.22 Acceptance of on-site inspection in the Federal Republic of 
Germany 
USIA: During the negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union 
have been talking about the need for verifying that the interrnediate-range 
nuclear missiles have in fact been removed or destroyed. Would you support 
on-site inspection even if that meant Soviet inspectors would be allowed into 
US military bases in the Federal Republic? or would you oppose on-site 
inspection? 
Support Oppose DK,NA 
May 1987 74 13 13 
with these issues aod lack even elementary pertinent knowledge. 
Third, popular evaluations of the superpowers do not follow 
irreversible trends. In the early 1980s, many observers were worried 
about an alleged growth of anti-Americanism in West Germany, 
and about images of the Soviet Union becoming niore positive than 
those of the United States. The spread of 'Gorbimania', though 
not restricted to withio the Federal Republic, has exacerbated such 
concems. After the INF agreement we have to recognize that 
evaluations of the United States, and even of President Reagan, 
greatly recovered, once it credibly demonstrated that arms control 
was still on its agenda. Much of the deterioration of the public's 
judgements about the United States and its policies in the earlier 
1980s can now be seen even more clearly as a direct consequence 
of the way American national security policy was 'marketed' in those 
years, maioly for internal consumption. The reversal of rhetoric, if 
not of policy, has been rewarded by a reversal in the trend of West 
German public opinion towards its most important ally.11 
The fourth observation we can make is that the polarization of 
public opinion on national security and arms control along party 
lines decreased in the context of the INF treaty, probably for three 
reasons. Arms control enjoys so widespread mass sympathies that 
it does not serve as an object of partisan strife. Even those who 
were opposed to some aspects of the accord bad good reasons 
to speak softly, in order not to be openly identified as hostile to 
this achievement. Furthermore, disagreements mainly occurred not 
between but within parties, notably the CDU-CSU, and even there 
strange conversions took place, which prevented opposition from 
crystallizing. With many exponents of the CDU in favour of the 
zero-option from the outset - and even the late Franz-Josef Strauss 
turned full swing from the view that it would undermine the basic 
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rationale of NATO to his pronouncement of trust in the Soviet 
commitment to arms control - smaller parts of the public than 
before could simply and conventionally toe the party line. Party 
lines had become a lot less well-defined and confrontational with 
the prospect of this treaty. Also, most partisan national security and 
arms control experts and spokesmen from all political camps bad been 
proven completely wrong anyway over these years. Those who wanted 
to strike an INF deal at every slightest sign of Eastern 'concessions' 
were wrong; those who suspected that the United States would never 
be ready to negotiate INF away in order to be able to restrict nuclear 
war to Europe were wrong; those who held that these weapons were 
indispensable for strategic 'coupling' found that the primary ally came 
to think otherwise; those who wanted zero-option proposals only to 
serve as a pacifier for the peace movement bad to witness both 
superpowers agreeing upon tbem; and tbose wbo believed arms 
control could only be negotiated with tbe Soviet Union from a position 
of strength bad to realize that the other side had become willing to give 
up its superiority in INF, and that this had at least as much to do with 
its internal political development as witb Western staunchness. 12 
Finally, fifth, and most importantly, the INF experience confirmed 
what students of public opinion on national security issues have been 
reiterating for quite some time. There is no basic incompatibility 
between preparations for military defence and national security 
concerns on the one side, and democratic public opinion on the 
other, but one of the constraints imposed by public opinion in 
West Germany is that it takes the two pillars defined in the Harmel 
Report of 1967 equally seriously: detente and a sufficient capacity for 
deterrence and defence.13 Anational security policy tbat neglects the 
detente and arms control components will in these days invariably be 
confronted witb public indifference, scepticism, or even antagonism. 
The INF treaty was so widely welcomed by an all-partisan public 
opinion consensus in the Federal Republic because it proved that this 
second pillar is viable, and is actively and with a will to compromise 
being pursued by the West. This recognition is extremely important 
for legitimizing the otber pillar, and witb it the Western alliance, 
wbich could not for ever enjoy its presently still high levels of support 
if it restricted itself exclusively to providing military security. The 
INF treaty thus has provided the public in West Germany witb 
some reassurance about NATO policies and the common defence 
though large portions of this reassurance bave been missing for a 
long time. The surest way to erode it again very rapidly would be 
to devise and implement military countermeasures which attempt 
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to revoke unilaterally the concessions the West has made in this 
agreement, 14 rather than to continue with and broaden the scope 
of serious attempts to press on with East-West arms control, both 
conventional and nuclear. 
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